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It has been something of a surprise for Europeans to realize that their 
advent in the Pacific was something less than a surprise. A number of 
accounts give the sense that their coming had been expected; that they 
were previously known beings “returned” or manifest in new form. 
Such ideas certainly fueled the millenarianism of cargo cults in Papua 
New Guinea. A further return was indicated in the future. So the one 
event encapsulated both past and future; indeed the two were 
conflated in so far as the second coming would bring not the gen-
erations unborn but generations already deceased, in the form of 
ancestors. Or if not the ancestors themselves, than their “cargo.” 
What triggered this recovery of the past in the future was the actual 
advent itself: the appearance of Europeans, and the stories that 
circulated about them. In this chapter, I argue that at least as far as 
much of Melanesia is concerned, and especially Papua New Guinea, 
Europeans initially presented a particular kind of image. Images that 
contain within them both past and future time do not have to be 
placed into a historical context, for they embody history themselves. It 
follows that people do not therefore have to explain such images by 
reference to events outside them: the images contain events. And here 
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we have a clue to the mixed reactions which early Europeans reported 
greeted their arrival in New Guinea. They were met with surprise, but 
the surprise was also tempered by nonchalance. As Rena Lederman 
(1986) reported of her own arrival at Mendi in the New Guinea 
Highlands, people were eager to assure her that they had not been 
caught off guard. Their own accounts of themselves already contained 
these otherwise unexpected newcomers. 
Images are presented through artifacts, and in cultures where 
artifacts are highly personalized (cf. Battaglia 1983) also through 
persons in their bodily form (O’Hanlon n.d.), and where it is equally 
the case that persons are objects of the regard of others, through 
performances of all kinds (Schieffelin 1985). People objectify or 
present themselves to themselves in innumerable ways, but must 
always do so through assuming a specific form. I suggest that Mela-
nesians may have seen the advent of Europeans in the form of an 
artifact or a performance. The interesting question then becomes who 
the Melanesians thought was the maker of the artifact, the producer of 
the performance. 
However, I do not present an ethnographically argued case. 
Rather, my intention is to raise some queries against anthropological 
perceptions of historical process. In evoking Melanesian “images,” I 
present a set of perceptions which poses problems for the still current 
division of labor between social / cultural anthropologists and those 
concerned with material culture of the kind that finds its way to 
museums. The result of the division has been that we have hidden 
from ourselves possible sources of insight into the processes by which 
people such as the Melanesians of Papua New Guinea deal with social 
change, and change themselves. 
 
Events:  Two views of t ime 
 
There is a connection between the study of artifacts and the study of 
time, and between the idea of historical context and of cultural or 
social context. A certain perception of event is implied in the way that 
Western anthropologists have often understood the work of 
historians, which mirrors the way they have also understood muse-
ologists and those interested in material culture. 
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Contrary to the aspirations of many practicing historians, 
anthropologists often take them to be interested in events. The idea of 
a concrete, incidental event holds much the same place in the 
anthropological worldview as does the idea of a concrete, incidental 
artifact. Events may be understood as the inevitable and thus “natural” 
outcomes of social arrangements, or even more poignant, the chance 
encounter that has not been anticipated by those arrangements. These 
are the two forms of event with which Marshall Sahlins (1985) is 
concerned in the Pacific. They are taken as items which must be 
brought to account in our system of knowledge, like so much raw 
material, like so many facts to be systematized. 
No account can recover the past, argues David Lowenthal (1985: 
215), “because the past was not an account; it was a set of events and 
situations.” But the account may well create a relation internal to itself 
between events and the organizing process or systems which 
link / explain them. Indeed, Sahlins’ (1985) study of Cook’s sojourn 
in Hawaii exemplifies the interest of social / cultural anthropology in 
locating events as the raw materials of their systematizing endeavors. 
For Sahlins approaches the interaction between the people of Hawaii 
and the adventurer Cook in terms of the alteration of meanings that 
occurs in the cultural interpretation of historical events and the 
impingements of history on culture. He dwells on the antimony 
between “the contingency of events and the recurrence of structures” 
(ibid.: xiii), expanding event into a relation between happening and 
structure. Structure and event are then mediated by a third term, “the 
structure of the conjuncture.” A structure must be seen to coordinate 
events: he dismisses the “pernicious distinction” between them in 
favor of the realization of structure in event and vice versa. There is 
no event without system, he proposes (ibid.: 154) and this, of course, 
has to be how anthropologists make knowledge for themselves. If 
Sahlins has displaced the pernicious distinction between event and 
structure with their irreducible relationship, this irreducible 
relationship can only be that between the knowing subject and the 
objects of knowledge. 
Sahlins suggests that an event as such should be seen as a relation 
between a certain happening and a symbolic system; it is the 
“happening” which takes the place of a natural fact in his scheme. A 
happening is domesticated through cultural interpretation. “The event 
is a happening interpreted” (ibid.: 153). This definition of event 
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replicates for Europeans and anthropologists what is also imputed to 
the people of Hawaii. Sahlins’ analysis of events turns on the manner 
in which the Hawaiian people interpreted and contextualized, placing 
concepts in correspondence with external objects: Hence his remark 
that 
Everything happens as if nothing happened: as if there could be 
no history, as if there could be no unexpected event, no 
happening not already culturally provided for. (ibid.: 30-31) 
Social action is an actualization or realization of the relationship 
between the concepts of the actors and the objects of their existence 
(ibid.: 154). Hence Sahlins’ focus on the events as interpreted action, 
which utilizes (I suggest) the idea of event much as anthropologists 
habitually think of artifact. It is cultural construction which our 
systematizing interests force us to subsume under a further relation 
which also includes its social context, viz. structure. “Structure” is a 
frame metaphor, so to speak. Thus an event is seen as a culturally 
interpreted happening; in the same way an artifact is said to have 
meaning, this meaning requiring anthropological elucidation by 
reference to the system which produces meanings. Happenings stand 
in an intransigent rather than reflecting or expressive relation to 
structure, but are nonetheless not explicable to the observer 
(Hawaiian or European) without reference to a context. A cultural 
event is thus perpetually created out of a natural happening. In turn, 
the anthropologists’ elucidation of structure takes these interpretations 
(culture) as the proper facts, the raw material, of systematic anthropo-
logical knowledge. Anthropology out-contextualizes indigenous 
(Hawaiian or European) contextualizing efforts. 
Whether or not we can use Melanesian material to comment on 
Polynesian, this excursus suggests one caveat in the opening up of 
historical investigation into culture and history in the Pacific. What do 
we intend to recover as ethnohistory? Thus we can, as I think Sahlins 
does, regard people’s interpretations as “their” history, a kind of 
ethnohistory: their version of what we do lies in their referential codes 
and contextualizing practices. I do not know if this would work in 
Melanesia. To recover the knowledge which comes from perceiving 
structural relationships between events, we might have to seek the 
counterpart of our systematizing endeavors in people’s artifacts and 
performances, in the images they strive to convey, and thereby in how 
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they present the effects of social action to themselves. And this would 
not look like our “history” at all.  
And it would not look like our history, because a quite different 
sense of time is at issue. 
These two views of time, European and Melanesian, can be 
apprehended as two ways of explaining or making manifest the nature 
of things. An event taken as incidental occurrence in nature, chancy 
and idiosyncratic, particular to the moment, is to be explained by 
being put into its historical (cultural) context. That is, its relations with 
other events is laid out, so that events are often seen in progression, 
one following another. An event taken as a performance is to be 
known by its effect: it is understood in terms of what it contains, the 
forms that conceal or reveal, registered in the actions of those who 
witness it. A succession of forms (cf. Wagner 1986b: 210) is a 
succession of displacements, each a substitution for what has gone 
previously and thus in a sense containing it, as it contains the effects it 
will have on the witness. Every image is in this sense a new image. 
Consequently, time is not a line between happenings; it lies in the 
capacity of an image to evoke past and future simultaneously. If this is 
the case, then in so far as they are concerned with their own 
uniqueness, the problem the makers of such images set themselves is 
how to overcome the recursiveness of time: how indeed to create an 
event that will be unique, particular, innovatory. What is true of time 
is also true of space. Analogously, we might say, space is not an area 
between points, it is the effectiveness of an image in making the 
observer think of both here and there, of oneself and others. The 
problem becomes how people can grasp the other’s perspective to 
make it reflect on themselves: artifacts are displayed and circulated in 
order to return that knowledge (Munn 1986). 
 
The advent of Europeans 
 
Despite the uniqueness of the event in the European record, Nikolai 
Miklouho-Maclay’s initial experiences on the Rai coast of New 
Guinea were to be repeated elsewhere. Whereas only certain 
Melanesians came to develop cargo cults, it seems that everywhere 
they expressed a pragmatic interest in transactions with the 
newcomers, and Lawrence notes the extent to which Miklouho-
Maclay had to satisfy local demand for his goods. He established his 
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position by gift-giving, among other things, and “his gifts were always 
returned” (1964: 60). At the same time, his biographer gives dramatic 
emphasis to Miklouho-Maclay’s surprise at being taken for “some 
kind of supernatural being” (Webster 1984: 72). The man who gave 
gifts was also a local deity (Lawrence 1964: 65; Webster 1984: 104). 
On the part of many Europeans, both those involved at the time 
and anthropologists afterwards, common assumptions have been that 
(1) the coming of Europeans was a unique event; (2) it therefore 
stretched people’s credulity, so that they had to find a place for the 
exotic strangers in their cognitive universe; so (3) it is no surprise that 
Melanesians regarded the first Europeans as spirits of deities; and (4) 
no surprise that in order to make sense of this untoward event, people 
reacted by trying to change their own lives and thus tap European 
power. Underlying these is the final assumption that (5) the Europ-
eans really were the powerful ones, not least because it was they who 
were the occurrence, who arrived in the Melanesians’ midst. In short, 
within anthropological analysis, the advent of Europeans has the status 
of a historical fact. The people of Papua New Guinea were brought 
face-to-face with a unique moment in history. 
I am sure people were taken by surprise. But should we interpret 
their reactions by assimilating that event to an event in history? Sup-
pose it were not a unique moment; that it was not the case that only 
the Europeans had power, and that it did not require that people 
create new contexts for coping with the untoward. Let me produce a 
set of counter-suppositions, synthetic in that it is drawn from what we 
know of many times and places, but nonetheless potentially helpful in 
considering specific times and places—such as the exploration of the 
Highlands documented by Bob Connolly and Robin Anderson (1984). 
Suppose, then, we assimilate that event, the arrival of Europeans, to 
something that Melanesians were in fact already making. Uniqueness, 
power, and context can all be put into a rather different light. 
First, uniqueness. The Melanesian world is one where people 
constantly take themselves by surprise. And what takes them by 
surprise are the performances and artifacts they create. One thinks 
here of figures and carvings, and also of landmarks held to 
commemorate past events (Rubinstein 1981), tools taken as evidence 
of divine creation (Battaglia 1983), or shell valuables which carry a 
record of their exchange with them (Damon 1980). Accomplishment 
itself is celebrated. Melanesian politics are typified by the achieved 
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nature of prestige—but the idea of achievement goes beyond politics, 
and inheres in the very constitution of collective activity such as 
ceremonial exchange, spirit cults, or whatever. People amaze them-
selves by their capacity for collective action, as the men of Mt. Hagen 
are amazed when they decorate on exchange occasions. Their 
presentation evinces the power they hope to have encompassed, at 
once a divination of past success and an omen for the future 
(Strathern and Strathern 1971). We may borrow Bruce Kapferer’s 
(1984: 193) observation from elsewhere, that rites are never mere 
repetition: acts and utterances constantly reassemble meanings. So 
however standard or traditional ways of doing things may be, the final 
configuration allows for the unexpected: a performance cannot be 
anticipated, for an image cannot be presented till the moment it is 
composed. 
Moreover, on many occasions, Melanesians present themselves as 
other than their appearance normally suggests. One may instance the 
disguise of self-decoration that hides the outer skin of the dancer by 
bringing his inner qualities to the surface (Strathern 1979); or the 
ambiguous displays of clans on the dancing ground that at once 
conceal their internal differences and reveal that no such conflicts 
exist (O’Hanlon 1983). Play may be made with man-spirit and other 
identities. Alfred Gell (1975: 243) observes of the Umeda that the 
identification of a masked dancer with the figure of a cassowary is only 
a disguise for the profounder identification of the cassowary with the 
man. The secret of the cassowary is that he is a man. Erik Schwimmer 
encapsulates this dualism in his comment on how often Melanesian 
dancers play in pairs, both parties representing spirits, masked or in 
mask-like attire: “Each knows himself to be a man, but when he looks 
at his partner he can see a spirit” (1984: 253). 
If they felt they were in the presence of an accomplishment of 
some kind, then Melanesians would not necessarily have to interpret 
the advent of Europeans as uniquely untoward. They were beings 
disguised: a surprise, but not a special surprise. And the identification 
of the men with spirits would be no more a special identification than 
the subsequent revelation that these were men. 
Second, power. Specific to Melanesians’ reactions is the way they 
sought out transactions with the Europeans. They appeared practical, 
even mercenary, despite the wonder and marvel with which 
Europeans frequently reported they were received. Indeed, some of 
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the Europeans (though this could hardly be said of the sober 
Miklouho-Maclay) seem to have been taken by their own image as a 
cause of wonder. The extent to which they subsequently dwelt on the 
apparently irrational elements in the indigenous response (as 
evidenced in “cargo thinking”) was a prop to this. 
Yet what must be explained on the Melanesian side is people’s 
simultaneous construction of Europeans as spirits and their non-
chalant acceptance (also reported by Lawrence 1964: 233) of what 
Europeans regarded as technological marvels. Their capacity to 
interact with these beings and get things out of them became evident 
very early on. It was that interaction which revealed these beings were 
(also) human. In the example which Jeffrey Clark (n.d.) gives, the two 
perceptions existed side by side. People thus appear to have assumed 
that the Europeans’ personal attributes, like other things they brought, 
were transferable, and the only problem was how to make the 
encounter work. Thus the Highlanders of Mt. Hagen sometimes 
think of themselves as turning “European” or else as remaining 
“Hagen,” as though these were choices between domains of personal 
efficacy. 
One might suppose it was the Melanesians who had a sense of 
power. If the advent were treated as performance, akin to that of the 
masked dancer, then who was the producer of it? It cannot be the 
dancing assemblage of the mask itself. Performances are the artifacts 
of persons (whether human or not), contrivances, displays of artifice, 
even tricks. Indeed, it is arguable that many kinds of events we regard 
as historical contingencies in Melanesians’ eyes have the character of 
improvisation (Wagner 1975). The makers of a performance are 
those who conceive it, fashion it in their diverse minds, and finally 
accomplish the display. A performance becomes an index of people’s 
capacities; an enactment of a feast “is an accomplishment, a kind of 
coup” (Wagner 1986b: 193). The inhabitants of the Rai Coast may 
well have been in terror when the Europeans first appeared, as 
Miklouho-Maclay’s (1975) diaries attest.1 But we cannot assume that it 
was simply terror of the powerful Europeans. My guess is that an 
                                                
1. However, any reader who wishes to pursue the details of Miklouho-Maclay’s 
reaction is advised to consult the translation published in Moscow in 1982 
(Progress Publishers). I am grateful to Daniil Tumarkin for his comments on the 
accuracy of the Madang version. 
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initial component of people’s terror may well have been at their own 
power—at what they had done to bring about an enactment of a quite 
extraordinary kind—or power they perhaps attributed to particular big 
men or neighboring peoples (J. Liep, personal communication). 
Someone must have produced them. 
There is a sense in which a witness is also an agent. A performance 
is completed by the audience (Schieffelin 1985), who may play an 
alternately passive and active role. In Melanesian cosmology, the 
agent or doer of an activity is often separated from the person (or 
happening) who compels the action. Thus under many patrilineal 
regimes, maternal kin are the “cause” of the prestations which flow to 
them as recipients by virtue of the health they bestow on their 
daughter’s / sister’s child; the active agents, those credited with the 
prestige which comes from taking action, are the paternal donors of 
the gifts. Donors show their power in accomplishing a prestation. In 
the same vein, to the extent that Europeans presented themselves as a 
cause for the people’s response, the capacity to act lay on the side of 
those who responded. The Europeans would be an inert cause for all 
this activity. 
Third, context. It is this question above all which dominates 
anthropological analyses of cargo cults. The assumption is that cults 
show people trying to adjust the cognitive disorientation, or psychic 
disturbance in Jukka Siikala’s (1982) critical phrase, created by the 
unexpected arrival of strangers in their midst. Yet their unexpected-
ness was, as it were, of an expected kind, merely a strange artifact. 
Initial difficulties in talking may have played a part in this. Europeans 
came hardly as enemies or allies would, with talk and ambiguous 
motivations, but confronted the beholders with, if not an unintelligi-
ble, an ineffable visual presence. Motivation had to be located in 
someone. I have suggested that the witnesses might know themselves 
as in some way the producers of the spectacle: if not themselves the 
makers of it, then themselves as the cause of their neighbors or 
enemies’ actions directed at them. But the point about a spectacle is 
that it is disconnected from everyday events, is the result of motivat-
ions hidden until the moment of revelation. It is in this sense also to 
be taken for itself. It only works if it is untoward. 
There is more here than simply the fact that there can be no 
happening that is not culturally provided for, that cannot be “coded” 
as a recognizable event of some sort (Sahlins 1985: 31). And more 
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thus than simply the assimilation of the newcomers to an existing 
pantheon of supernatural beings. The point about the sequence I 
have described is its self-contained nature. We do not have to imagine 
the event as an “interpreted happening.” 
An artifact or performance grasped for itself is grasped as an 
image. An image definitively exists out of context; or, conversely, it 
contains its own prior context. The problems all lay in what was to be 
the future outcome of the performance, its consequences for the 
future, what would be revealed next, in short, its further effect. 
Consequently, the European advent did not have to be put into its 
social context. Melanesians did not have to make sense of it: they did 
not have to evoke the wider cultural and social milieu from which the 
Europeans came since they were under no compulsion to explain 
them. And ignorance of this context did not put the Europeans 
beyond reach, as the Europeans may well have thought it did. (No 
doubt they would have liked to have felt beyond reach, till education 
had taught people about Western society and the historical signifi-
cance of the moment of contact.) On the contrary, the very act of 
presentation constituted the only context that was relevant—if 
Melanesians were also inclined to open the image up to explanation, 
then the question would be concerned with motivation, to be elicited 
or tested by the kinds of relationships into which the strangers could 
be enticed to engage with the Melanesians themselves. 
In short, we do not have to suppose a cognitive disorientation 
because we do not have to suppose that Melanesians thought they 
were dealing with beings whose decontextualization presented a 
problem. 
 
Image and context 
 
Melanesian responses are unlikely to have been stable. Indeed, what I 
have sketched here probably occupied only a point in a longer 
process which would turn these constructions inside-out, locate power 
on the Europeans’ part and Melanesians as the inert causes of it, and 
eventually dismantle the constructions altogether. I imagine them 
merely in order to give pause to the kinds of constructions that 
Western anthropologists have in the past so easily imposed on 
historical events and the clash of cultures. It was suggested that such 
Western constructions often play on an analogy between putting 
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artifacts into their social / cultural context and laying out events as 
sequences which appear as points in time to be connected up to one 
another. Let me advance the argument with reference to the 
Melanesian construction of artifacts perceived as images. 
I draw on Roy Wagner’s analysis of artifacts created by the Barok 
of New Ireland (1986b) as well as his theorizing on obviation (1986a 
and elsewhere). The artifacts include the spatial structure of their 
men’s house, performances such as feasting, and in general the 
metaphors by which people construe ideas about power. In the minds 
of the Barok, such items evoke commonly held images. By “image” 
Wagner intends us to understand a particular type of trope. Per-
ceptual image (or “point metaphor”) exists in relationship to 
referential coding (or “frame metaphor”) (Wagner 1986a: 31). Coding 
opens out a symbol with reference to its constituent parts and thus its 
relation to other symbols: it expands and obviates an image by 
interpreting it, by setting it within a context which thus becomes part 
of its meaning. An image on the other hand condenses or collapses 
context into itself in the sense that all points of reference are obviated 
or displaced by its single form. 
The constructions at issue may be illustrated through an example 
of an artifact that circulated all over Melanesia: the ceremonial stone 
axe. Battaglia (1983) presents an illuminating exegesis for axes used 
on Sabarl in the Massim. The triangular shape provided by the angle 
of the blade and haft may be perceived “as image of action and 
directed movement” (ibid.: 296). It at once evokes past actions and 
foreshadows future ones. Sabarl comment that it has the shape of 
mortuary feasts, that is, a lateral movement of wealth items from the 
father’s side (the left arm of a person) to the mother’s side (the right 
arm), which commemorates the support that kin gave a person in life. 
The elbow thus represents “the joint in the socially vital movement of 
reciprocal giving . . . [and] the ideal route of valuable objects away 
from person, clan or village and . . . back again” (ibid.: 297). But 
that explanation also covers (obviates) others. On the joint itself is the 
figure of a bird with a snake in its mouth, an image of a mythical 
challenge presented as sexual opposition. Battaglia argues that the 
ideal support relations between kin are transformed at death into 
individualistic conflict between them (over inheritance and such). Yet 
the simultaneity of ideas about support and conflict contained within 
the axe cannot be matched by the explanations which people give, for 
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these must always place one perception in relation to another. An 
image is distinct from an element in a comprehensive coding or 
exegesis.  
It is less the privileging of one interpretation over another that is 
pertinent than the relationship between interpretation (frame 
metaphor) and the apprehension of something that is only itself (point 
metaphor). An object at one juncture taken for granted, as an image 
“standing for itself,” at another may be coded through reference to 
further images (whose meanings must at that point be taken for 
granted). The bird-elbow intrinsic to the Sabarl axe has a shape that 
may also he explained as a map for kin relations; when these become 
points of reference for the axe, they take on assumed qualities of their 
own (are images of support, point metaphors). But the kin relations 
may then be opened to explanation, as happens in the give and take 
of the mortuary exchanges of which the axes are a part, in which case 
they cease to be taken for granted; and so on. The process of 
explanation by referencing or decoding deprives the image of its 
power to elicit taken-for-granted meanings. Conversely, by itself, the 
Sabarl axe is not a simple illustration of meanings describable in other 
terms: rather, it presents to perception a particular form that is its 
own. What the Sabarl Islander grasps in handling the axe that can be 
verbally explained as “the same as” kin relationships activated in 
exchange is not those kin relationships in fact. For when they become 
the focus of attention, kin are able to do things with their exchanges of 
valuables—including the axes themselves—which reinterpret the ideal 
route that valuables should take. In effect, in explaining or acting out 
their relationships to one another, kinsfolk subvert the taken-for-
granted status of paternal support in the bird-elbow image. One 
relationship substitutes or displaces another. 
An artifact, or a performance such as an exchange, perceived as an 
image, is not reducible to the coding explanations that accompany it, 
or vice versa. Steven Albert (1986: 241) makes the point apropos 
malanggan for which other New Irelanders are famous: their 
expressivity “is to be found in the organisation of forms in the 
carvings, and not in some relation between particular forms and their 
referents.” 
Referential coding is not only found in people’s verbal explana-
tions: Wagner’s sequence between point metaphor and frame 
metaphor, between image and code, can be realized in the contract-
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ion and expansion of any kind of artifact. Images may substitute for 
one another in a succession of analogies. At the same time, images 
both contain and elicit interpretations. Any one image, he argues, may 
synthesize several meanings, and in provoking response elicits this 
synthesis in the perceiver; the synthesis is taken apart when those 
meanings become expanded (coded) in reference to other images. 
Thus the meanings of the Sabarl axe are desynthesized when they are 
acted out with respect to the maternal and paternal kin who exchange 
axes as valuables. The coding is accomplished through further 
performance or assemblage of artifacts, as well as through verbal 
exegesis. It is significant, however, that exegesis is accorded a special 
place by Barok. The effect of description may be taken as contrary to 
the effect produced by an image (including a verbal image such as a 
metaphor), so image in turn is understood by Barok as a distinctive 
means of construing power or effectiveness: “An image can and must 
be witnessed or experienced, rather than merely described or 
summed up verbally” (Wagner 1986b: xiv), and if it must be 
experienced in order to be understood, “the experience of its effects 
is at once its meanings and its power” (ibid.: 216). Barok remain 
suspicious of talk. Talk is always part of an effort to manipulate events 
and relationships, making motivation ambiguous, whereas—like the 
revelation of gift (Biersack 1982)—in producing images, people 
produce the effects by which they know what they themselves really 
are. For “producing an image” means that an artifact has assumed a 
specific form (the image) in the mind of the viewer. 
Images are reflected self-knowledge. The way in which a person 
responds to a taboo or an injunction shows that person to be the kind 
of kinsman or kinswoman he / she is; similarly the visual figure of 
the men’s house Barok build contains men’s feasting activities and 
ancestral power in such a way as to make manifest their legitimated 
relationship with the dead. When the advent of Europeans created an 
affect similar to such “images,” it would also provoke self-knowledge. 
It would present a particular form to the observer, known by the 
response it thereby elicited. As the carrier of (bearer of) its effects, the 
observer (in whose mind the image forms) was also in this sense, like 
all audiences, a producer of them. 
I deliberately refer to the process of coding and referentiality in 
verbal explanation in order to draw a comparison with certain 
Western practices of knowledge. When Melanesians construct know-
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ledge about themselves and their relations with others, they may well 
draw on perceptions that have the status of image where a European 
scholar would deploy verbal concepts in a referential, coding manner. 
A European is likely to explicate any one relationship through refer-
ence to others, through his or her description creating systems by 
bringing different concepts into connection with one another. Above 
all, he or she will make sense of individual incidents by putting them 
into their social or cultural context: an encounter with strangers 
requires understanding in terms of the society from which the 
strangers come, as a happening must be interpreted as an event in 
history. One might imagine, however, that the Melanesian would 
understand encounters in terms of their effects. It is the effect which is 
created, and effects (images) are produced through the presentation of 
artifacts. A concept of society is not an explanatory context for 
people’s acts; rather sociality, as Wagner (1975) argues, consists in the 
implicit conventions against which people innovate and improvise. 
They construct further artifacts, such as cargo cults or wealth 
transactions, to see what the further effects will be. And the revelation 
will always come as a surprise. 
 
A division of labor 
 
The comparison throws light on certain assumptions held by social 
and cultural anthropologists over a recent period in anthropological 
history. 
Ever since the 1920s, much of Western anthropology has been 
concerned with approaching others through the elucidation of their 
worldviews. Part of our knowledge about material artifacts, for 
instance, must be our knowledge of their knowledge: it is taken for 
granted that we study the significance which such artifacts have for the 
people who make them, and thus their interpretations of them. 
Anthropologists, therefore, uncover meanings by putting people’s 
own meanings into their social and cultural context. One might call 
this the phase of modernism in English-speaking anthropology 
(Ardener 1985; Strathern 1987).  
It gave rise to a division of labor in which the study of material 
culture became divorced from social or cultural anthropology. On the 
one hand were experts who looked at artifacts (museologists), while 
on the other hand were specialists in the study of society or culture 
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(social and cultural anthropologists). Over this period in anthropo-
logical history, the latter explicitly conceived themselves as experts in 
the elucidation of social / cultural contexts. Items of all kinds (not 
only artifacts but events and relationships) were to be understood by 
seeing how they related or referred to others. The compulsion 
applied equally to the artifacts of contemporary peoples and the 
remains or exemplars that found their way to museums. Indeed, I 
have suggested that there are strong parallels between anthropologists’ 
attitudes towards history and towards the study of material culture. 
“Material culture” came to designate a kind of technological substrate 
by contrast with the abstraction “culture,” which designated the values 
and modes of social life. 
There were always notable exceptions, and current interest in the 
culture of consumption (see, for instance, Miller 1987) suggests we 
can refer to this period as a past epoch. Nevertheless, for the time to 
which I refer, much anthropological analysis was almost exclusively 
concerned with the elucidation of systems—making sense of items by 
relating them in a coherent manner. The meanings of artifacts were 
elucidated by their context, whether the context was open to 
indigenous reflection, to be contextualized in turn, or was presented 
as a model on the ethnographer’s part. Making social (or cultural) 
context the frame of reference had one important result. It led to the 
position that one should really be studying the framework itself (the 
social context = society). The artifacts were merely illustration. For if 
one sets up social context as the frame of reference in relation to 
which meanings are to be elucidated, then explicating that frame of 
reference obviates or renders the illustrations superfluous: they 
become exemplars or reflections of meanings which are produced 
elsewhere. It was in this sense that social anthropology could proceed 
independently of the study of material culture. Material culture 
became perceived as background information. Even when art forms 
were foregrounded for study, it was usually because they were made 
visible by some social process such as “ritual.” In the many analyses of 
art or decoration undertaken in Melanesia, anthropologists often took 
as their task simply locating these objects within a frame already 
described in other terms (in terms of values and principles generated 
by the politico-religious system or embedded in kinship structure or 
gender relations or whatever). 
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Frames of reference are intrinsic to the modernist anthropological 
exercise. These are the relationships within which we place our 
discoveries about people’s cultural lives. The reason that material 
objects appear so intransigent is precisely because they are not the 
framework itself. Rather, they occupy a dual position, both its raw 
material and illustrative of its principles and values (at once “nature” 
and “culture” in relation to system). This creates a problem for the 
understanding of Melanesian perceptions. 
In supplying social context, the inquiring ethnographer does not 
merely translate other people’s referencing into his or hers, but 
weights the perception of an object. An axe explained as the elbow of 
exchange partnerships is relocated within a framework which occludes 
both other frameworks and its significance as a synthetic image in 
itself. If decoding the meaning of an object makes certain presump-
tions about its referentiality, then putting them within their social 
context becomes a symbolic move analogous to the expansion of a 
frame metaphor from a point metaphor. Referentiality always intro-
duces a further set of tropes. The whole perception is now the object 
plus its explanation, the interpreted happening indeed. 
Keesing (1987) has commented on Melanesians’ frequent 
reluctance to give exegesis—to explain things by expanding frames 
verbally. Professed agnosticism is a kind of double resistance—first to 
altering meaning by making out one image to be another and 
secondly to privileging one frame that would exclude others. For talk 
always creates its own versions and transformations of what is being 
discussed (e.g., Goldman 1983; Rumsey 1986). Translation from one 
medium to another (as giving literal explanation for a metaphor or 
describing an object in words) alters the significance of what is being 
presented. 
We might reflect again on the self-proclaimed distance of Western 
social and cultural anthropologists from their material-cultural 
counterparts. If anthropologists are specialists in social contexts, in 
constantly apprehending items through frame metaphors (“society,” 
“culture”) which provide points of reference for the meaning of 
artifacts or art productions, then what are museologists but conservers 
of images? The exploration of internal design, the attention to artifact 
qua artifact, the relating of one style to others, the preservation of 
exemplars, suggests a self-contained, self-referential universe. The 
move from classification to aesthetics in museum displays could be 
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seen as one attempt to present a perception that consciously 
minimizes reference to wider social or cultural contexts. 
This is a controversial assertion; much museology is devoted to 
putting objects into their cultural context, producing functional and 
interpretative displays, objects as artifacts not art (Clifford 1985a; 
Williams 1985). At the same time, we may note George Stocking’s 
observation on the space in which museum pieces exist. Encompass-
ing both object and viewer, it has a “complex three-dimensionality that 
distinguishes the museum archive from essentially two-dimensional 
repositories of linear text” (Stocking 1985: 4). Because they are 
removed from their original contexts in time and space (which can 
never be recovered), and recontextualized in others, the meanings of 
material forms preserved in museums are problematic. But, as a 
result, there must always be a perceived discontinuity between the 
image and its new context (cf. Clifford 1985b). We thus imagine that 
the material artifact cannot be domesticated in quite the same way as 
texts, verbal descriptions of events, are subordinated in anthropo-
logical accounts to an overall analysis of society or culture; it is after all 
the objects themselves that appear to be on display, not the analysis of 
society. Consequently, they command attention in themselves. In so 
far as we perceive this to be the case, they remain figures against the 
grounding social context. Thus Westerners apprehend the responses 
they evoke as inevitably having an element of the aesthetic to it. What-
ever battery of meanings and uses are ascribed to the museum object, 
display draws attention to form, explicitly confronting the observer 
with his or her own perceptions, and thus his or her act of appropria-
tion in looking at them. 
Perhaps the museum that looks like an art gallery presents us with 
a certain analogy to the Melanesian construction of image. It is, of 
course, only a partial analogy. The objects both elicit a reaction on the 
part of the observer—in a manner analogous to the presentation of a 
Melanesian image—and as like as not will elicit an idiosyncratic 
reaction: that is, the self-knowledge so produced will necessarily be 
the self-knowledge of a Western kind, the aesthetics of personal 
appreciation. To recreate the elicitory power that Melanesian images 
had for the people who made them, one would have to be able to 
take for granted the cultural values and social relations of which they 
were composed. The paradox is that if it is taken for granted, such 
Melanesian knowledge of sociality is not referenced and coded. But 
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we can only grasp that dimension through our referential and coding 
procedures. 
This paradox is intractable, because for us there can be no 
resolution in favor of one kind of presentation over the other—our 
aesthetic and referential strategies bypass one another and all we can 
do is move between the two points and know that each is inadequate. 
But that movement is essential. The “trick” would be to make that 
movement itself at once an image and a code in the anthropologist’s 
mind. That might be approximated in the way we control our own 
metaphors in writing. 
I have argued that we should extend our concept of artifact to 
performance and to event. We might get a closer approximation to 
Melanesians’ idea if we deliberately use that extension to switch 
metaphors. If we are prepared to see artifacts as the enactment of 
events, as memorials of and celebrations to past and future 
contributions (cf. O’Hanlon n.d.)—if the axe blade really is an icon of 
exchange relationship—then we must be prepared to switch the 
metaphors the other way too—to empty our notion of history as the 
natural or occurrence of events that present a problem for structure— 
to talk about people using an event the way they may use a knife, or 
creating an occasion the way they create a mask or demonstrate 
personal efficacy in laying out the phases of a feast according to strict 
social protocol. And that is why I chose the most event-full, chance-
full occurrence in our own eyes as illustration, the arrival of 
Europeans. For we can extend the same metaphor—talking about 
events as artifacts—to visualize how people act as though they had 
power when confronted with the untoward. 
Perhaps the elucidation of possible Melanesian responses to such 
historical events will throw light on the changeability of these cultures. 
Melanesians’ readiness to accommodate novelty and the unexpected 
has long been commented upon. A significant feature, and one that 
might have been important in processes of cultural differentiation, is 
that the enactment of social life was always a little unexpected. It was 
not the ground rules of sociality that people were concerned to 
represent to themselves, but (following Wagner 1975) the ability of 
persons to act in relation to these. This ability to act was captured in a 
performance or an artifact, improvisations which created events as 
achievements. In this sense, all events were staged to be innovatory. 
Melanesians’ own strategies of contextualization necessarily included 
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themselves as witnesses of such spectacles. If they sought explanation, 
it would be to account for motivation (who produced the spectacle 
and with what intent). That would then let them know who they 
themselves were, for in entering into relations with Europeans, they 
would interpret the European presence through the only meaningful 
reference possible, in terms of its effects upon themselves. 
Let me rewrite an ethnographic vignette. Andrew Strathern (1971: 
xii) reports the words of an old man from Hagen who told how his 
neighbors had reacted to the appearance of the first administrative 
patrol in the area. The white man was thought to be a pale-skinned 
cannibal ogre, but “then he gave us shell valuables in return for pigs, 
and we decided he was a human.” The unspoken side of this state-
ment might read: “Then we gave him pigs in return for shell valu-
ables, and we realized we were human still.” 
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